Impacts of short selling restrictions on stocks traded at Borsa İstanbul by Çakın, Tuğba
 IMPACTS OF SHORT SELLING RESTRICTIONS ON 
STOCKS TRADED AT BORSA İSTANBUL 
 
 
A Master Thesis 
By 
 
 
Tuğba ÇAKIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Management 
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
Ankara 
August 2014 
 
 
  
 
IMPACTS OF SHORT SELLING RESTRICTIONS ON STOCKS 
TRADED AT BORSA İSTANBUL 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
 
 
By 
 
 
Tuğba ÇAKIN 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
in 
 
 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF 
MANAGEMENT 
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BILKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
August 2014 
  
 I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in Management.  
 
 
---------------------------------  
Assoc. Prof. Aslıhan Altay-Salih  
Supervisor  
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in Management.  
 
 
---------------------------------  
Assoc. Prof. Zeynep Önder  
Examining Committee Member  
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in Management.  
 
 
---------------------------------  
Ass. Prof. Seza Danışoğlu  
Examining Committee Member  
 
 
Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences  
 
 
---------------------------------  
Prof. Erdal Erel 
Director 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
IMPACTS OF SHORT SELLING RESTRICTIONS ON STOCKS TRADED 
AT BORSA İSTANBUL 
 
 
Çakın, Tuğba 
M.S., Department of Management 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Aslıhan Altay-Salih 
 
August 2014 
 
This study investigates impacts of short sale restrictions, particularly uptick rule 
which was repealed at 02.01.2014, on returns of stocks traded at Borsa Istanbul 
between January 2012 and March 2014. Firstly, time-series regressions are 
conducted to test the performance of the Fama - French (1993) three-factor model 
with four different portfolios, sorted according to their short sale volume ratio 
before and after repeal of uptick rule. The results show that in the after period 
portfolio consisting of heavily shorted stocks has the only significant and negative 
Jensen’s alpha. This indicates that after repeal of uptick rule heavily shorted stocks 
underperform probably because of reflection of the pessimists’ beliefs as short 
positions which drive asset prices down unnecessarily. Secondly, an additional 
short sale factor (SS), is calculated and regressed as an fourth explanatory variable 
in Fama-French model in an attempt to determine the common risk factors that 
capture the variation in stock returns before and after repeal of uptick rule. This 
study explores that while short sale factor (SS) substitutes size factor before repeal 
of uptick rule it doesn’t replace size factor after repeal of uptick rule and gains 
independent explanatory power from size. 
Keywords: Asset pricing, Fama-French Model, Short sale 
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ÖZET 
 
AÇIĞA SATIŞ DÜZENLEMELERİNİN İSTANBUL BORSASINDA İŞLEM 
GÖREN PAYLAR ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ 
 
 
Çakın, Tuğba 
Yüksek Lisans, İşletme Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Aslıhan Altay-Salih 
 
Ağustos 2014 
 
Bu çalışma, açığa satış düzenlemelerinin özellikle 02.01.2014 tarihinden 
uygulamadan kaldırılan yukarı adım kuralının Ocak 2012 ve Mart 2014 tarihleri 
arasında İstanbul Borsası’nda işlem gören paylar üzerindeki etkisini 
araştırmaktadır. Öncelikle, yukarı adım kuralının kaldırılmasından önce ve sonra 
olmak üzere açığa satış işlem hacimlerine göre oluşturulan portföylerin Fama – 
French (1993) üç faktör modeli kullanılarak performanslarını ölçmek için zaman 
serisi testi yapılmıştır.  Sonuç olarak yukarı adım kuralının kaldırılmasından sonra 
yoğun olarak açığa satış yapılan paylardan oluşan portföyün Jensen alfasının 
negatif ve anlamlı olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Bu durumda yukarı adım kuralının 
kaldırılmasının ardından pay hakkında olumsuz fikirlerin açığa satış olarak 
yansımasından dolayı fiyatların gereğinden aşağı çekildiği ve yoğun olarak açığa 
satış yapılan payların beklenenden daha düşük performans gösterdiği sonucu 
çıkarılabilir. İkinci olarak, ilave açığa satış faktörü (SS) hesaplanmış ve dördüncü 
faktör olarak Fama French faktör modeline eklenmiştir. Sonuçta, açığa satış faktörü 
yukarı adım kuralı kaldırılmadan önce büyüklük faktörünün yerini alırken yukarı 
adım kuralının uygulamadan kaldırılmasından sonra modelde büyüklük 
faktöründen bağımsız olarak açıklayıcı güce kavuşmuştur.  
Keywords: Varlık fiyatlandırması, Fama-French modeli 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
There has been a long debate about short selling from the very beginning of 
financial markets. Short sales date back to the early seventeenth century, when first 
uncovered on stocks of the Dutch East India Company in 1609 (Bris et al., 2007). 
The practice was banned in the following year. Since then, different practices and 
regulations have been in effect in many different jurisdictions and have alternated 
throughout time along with debates about the efficiency of the constraints on short 
sales.   
Short sale is basically defined as a sale of a security that the seller does not 
own. It can be executed by using two different methods, covered or naked. In 
covered short sale, the investor borrows the related stock or has an agreement to 
borrow before selling short. On the other hand, in naked short selling the investors 
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neither borrows nor has an agreement to borrow before selling. In this sense, 
regulators approach may differ according to the type of short selling and their risk.  
Short sellers primary motive is speculation which involves selling ‘high’ and 
buying back ‘low’ in the future in a way that negative views about stocks are reflected 
to overvalued stocks. Another purpose of short sale can be hedging by means of which 
investors offset their positions at derivative or other structured products by selling 
short in spot stock markets. Short sale may be used by arbitrageurs to make use of 
valuation differences between same securities on different markets. Another 
common motive of short sale is market making activities where main orientation is 
to complete the transactions instead of making use of overvalued stocks or other 
arbitrage opportunities. 
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
regulators responded global financial crisis by announcing rescue plans for 
distressed financial institutions and later tight new restrictions on the short selling 
of financial stocks.  These interventions rekindle discussions on impacts of short 
sale restrictions in markets and academic environment. On one hand, regulators 
argue that short sale restrictions are necessary in order to reduce risk of 
manipulation, prevent disorder in settlement and curb short selling’s capacity to 
drive prices rapidly down during distressed times. On the other hand, it is argued 
that short sale restrictions disrupt efficient price formation in markets. Primary 
concern of opponents of short sale restrictions is that short sale restrictions retain 
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pessimist’s view to reflect to market and in this way prevent informational 
efficiency.    
There are many tools used by regulators to capture the potential benefits of 
short selling while simultaneously reduce the negative impacts of short selling to 
markets. International Organization of Securities Commission’s 2003 Report on 
short sale, “Report on Transparency of Short Selling”, classifies restrictions 
imposed by regulators as follows, i) the types of securities that may, and may not, 
be sold short; ii) the processes by which short sales are executed and iii) settlement 
requirements of specific relevance to short selling. 
In Turkey, short sale can be executed from the very first day of the stock 
markets. The first restrictions on short sale with Serial:V Number:18 
“Communiqué on Margin Trading, Short Sales and Lending and Borrowing of 
Securities” came into effect in 1994 and was updated in 2003. This Communiqué 
has provisions relating to initial and maintenance margin for short selling and 
requires flagging while sending short sale orders to Exchange. In addition, there 
had been a provision on price limitation at short sales, known as up-tick rule which 
was repealed as of 02.01.2013. This rule required that short sale should be executed 
at a price higher than the last execution price.  
In parallel with developments in Turkish stock market, short sale practice 
has become widespread in time. The annual average of daily share of short sale in 
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total volume was 2.05 % in 2005 while it increased to 6.40 % in 2010 and jumped 
to 15.95 % in first quarter of 2014 in Borsa İstanbul. This thesis basically aims to 
discover impacts of short sale and short sale restrictions on prices of stocks traded 
at Borsa İstanbul in period between January 2012 – March 2014 by using Fama-
French Three Factor Model. 
 Firstly, the research question of whether portfolios of highly shorted stocks 
generally underperform the market is explored. After regressing Fama-French three 
factor model with four different short sale portfolios before and after repeal of 
uptick rule, the results reveal that all jensen’s alpha but the most highly shorted 
stock portfolio in after period is insignificant indicating that there is no under or 
overvaluation in these portfolios before and after repeal of uptick rule.  
Secondly, in order to check if short sale has any role at explaining the 
causes of common variation in average returns, short sale is used as an additional 
explanatory variable in Fama French factor model. SS, defined as the difference 
between returns of most highly shorted portfolio (stocks in 4
th
 portfolio) and the 
least shorted portfolio (stocks in 1
st
 portfolio) is weekly calculated and regressed as 
an fourth explanatory variable in Fama-French model. When short sale is added to 
model as an explanatory factor before repeal of short sale, short sale factor replaces 
the size factor while after repeal of uptick rule market factor and size factor keep 
their significance and short sale is significant also. It means that short sale factor 
doesn’t replace the size factor anymore and has its independent explanatory power 
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from size.  It is probably because in absence of uptick rule it gets easier to sell short 
comparatively illiquid stocks and highly shorted stocks don’t consist of only large 
stocks anymore.  
This finding has valuable insights for impacts of short sale restrictions, 
particularly uptick rule on markets. First of all, repeal of uptick rule results in increase 
at short sale volume. On the other hand, the presence of uptick rule doesn’t tend to 
cause stock overvaluation, however after repeal of uptick rule heavily shorted 
stocks underperform. In addition, it appears that before repeal of uptick rule short 
sale has an explanatory power replacing size factor. However, after repeal of uptick 
rule it doesn’t replace size factor anymore and becomes an additional explanatory 
factor in asset pricing models.  
The remaining of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents 
general information about short sale including definition, practice, regulation and 
recent developments. Chapter 3 overviews short sale practices and regulations as 
well as lending in Turkey. Chapter 4 reviews the literature on impacts of short 
selling restrictions on markets. Chapter 5 introduces the data, methodology, the 
descriptive statistics of the returns of short sale portfolios and empirical results 
before and after repeal of uptick rule. Chapter 6 presents conclusions.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
SHORT SALE IN GENERAL 
 
 
 
2.1. Definition of Short Sale  
Short sale, defined as a sale of a security that the seller does not own, is one 
of the basic trading strategies which allows traders to make profits even in bear 
markets.  Short sellers mainly hope to profit from a declining price movement or 
mean to hedge a long position in the same or related securities. 
Short sale can mainly be executed in two different ways, explicitly and 
implicitly. In explicit method, investors sell the security in traditional ways in 
markets. On the other hand, investors can prefer derivatives in order to take short 
position and make profit from declines in prices by using derivatives, such as 
futures, forwards, options, credit default swaps etc. 
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In traditional way, short sale can be executed by using two different 
methods, covered or naked. The covered short sale consists of two steps. As a first 
step short seller borrows the shares he is going to sell short. Investor can find these 
shares from his broker-dealer or institutional investors. The brokerage house can 
lend the share either from his inventory or its customers’ accounts that allow 
lending of their shares. Another supplier for lending is institutional investors that 
generally invest in long horizon and want to benefit lending fee in short term. In 
some countries, including Turkey, there are also organized markets for lending 
shares. The investors may borrow from this market as well. In borrowing 
mechanism, just as in money lending markets, the borrower, namely short seller 
pay a lending fee to the lender. The fee may differ depending on availability and 
demand of the stock. In addition, the borrower should give collateral to the lender 
as a guarantee for returning the share. The collateral is generally in the form of cash 
or liquid government bonds. In practice, the lending fee and yield of collateral are 
netted and the difference is called “rebate rate”. Depending on the difference, the 
borrower or lender pays the rebate rate.  Right after borrowing, the short seller sells 
previously borrowed stock in the market place at current price. (The buyer doesn’t 
know that the stock is sold short) Later on, as a second step, the short seller closes 
his position by repurchasing the share from the market and returns it to lender and 
gets its collateral from lender.  The mechanism is as following. 
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                     Step 1       Step 2 
In naked short selling, the short selling type which the market and 
regulators are most anxious about, the short sellers sell the stocks without 
borrowing the related stock. In this case, short sellers either borrow the stock till 
settlement date or fail to deliver the stock on settlement date. The regulators may 
differ their regulations according to these two types of short selling.   
LENDER 
SHORT SELLER 
MARKET 
Lending fee borrowing 
Lending fee Stock Selling 
MARKET 
LENDER 
SHORT SELLER 
Stock returning 
Purchasing 
Stock 
purchasing 
Market Price 
Figure 1 Short Selling Mechanism 
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International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) 2003 Report 
on short sale, “Report on Transparency of Short Selling” emphasizes the 
importance of definition for establishing effective trading controls and reporting as 
well as disclosure requirements for short selling and provides broader classification of 
short sale in order to provide clear understanding from regulators point of view 
which is as follows.  
Table 1 Short Sale Classification 
Deliverability at point of sale 
 
Classification 
Seller has purchased but not yet 
received securities. 
Not normally considered to be a short 
sale (though it might be considered a 
technical short if delivery is deferred 
beyond the intended settlement date). 
Seller has exercised an option, warrant, 
conversion or other contractual right 
that would lead to delivery. 
Not normally considered to be a short 
sale. 
Seller has borrowed securities.  Normally considered a short sale 
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Seller has agreement to borrow 
securities.  
Normally considered a short sale. 
Seller has made no arrangements to 
borrow securities at the point of sale, 
or otherwise prior to settlement date. 
Normally considered a (naked) short 
sale. 
2.2. The Rationale behind Short Sales  
2.2.1. Speculation  
The most controversial rationale behind short selling is speculation purpose. 
Short sellers primary purpose is selling ‘high’ and buying back ‘low’ in which they 
reflect their negative opinions about stocks which they consider overvalued. The 
speculative short sellers regularly search for overvalued stocks in order to make profit 
from future price declines. This rationale raises ethical and political concerns as some 
argue that this kind of short selling endangers economic stability. On the other hand, 
this enables negative information to be reflected in prices in an efficient way. 
2.2.2. Hedging  
Another important rationale behind short sale is hedging by means of which 
investors offset their positions at derivative products by selling short in spot stock 
markets. It is a way of managing or mitigating risk for investors in their portfolios. 
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For instance, a financial institution who writes put option on a specific stock can 
sell short underlying stock in order to hedge its risk. Similarly, if someone has 
convertible bonds he/she can hedge its risk by selling short the underlying stock. 
There are plenty of ways of using short sale in hedge strategies.  
2.2.3. Market Making Activities  
Market makers have commitment to guarantee two-way prices in order to 
provide smooth functioning of markets. They often use short selling to provide 
liquidity to the market. Their main orientation is to complete the transactions 
instead of making use of overvalued stocks or other arbitrage opportunities. Since 
they serve smooth functioning of the markets, they generally exempt from short 
selling restrictions in many jurisdictions. 
2.2.4. Arbitrage Opportunities 
Short selling can be used by arbitragers to make use of valuation differences 
between same securities on different markets. In this way they serve the market by 
correcting the price anomalies between equivalent securities. For instance, an 
exchange-traded fund mimicking an index and the stocks composing the index 
having different valuations. If the price of ETF is higher than underlying stocks, an 
arbitrager can benefit from this inequality by selling short ETF and take long 
position on stocks composing the index.  
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Diether et al. (2009) shows different approach at stating the rationale behind 
short selling and summarizes facts behind short selling behaviour of investors 
under four main pillars. First is that short sellers have inside information about 
future fundamental values, which suggests that short sellers are corporate insiders 
or can get material nonpublic information from the Corporation earlier than other 
investors. Second explanation states that short sellers exploit market frictions or 
behavioral biases that may cause price to deviate from fundamental values in the 
short run. This alternative suggests that short sellers are likely to be more 
sophisticated than the average investors. Boehmer et al. (2008) states that 
institutional investors execute about 75 % of all short sales, confirming this 
alternative. A third alternative suppose that short sellers act as voluntary liquidity 
providers, and take step and trade when there is a significant and temporary buy-
order imbalance in the market. As buying orders decreases, prices converge to their 
fundamental values and short sellers can close their positions at profit. This 
explanation states that high level of short sales is contemporaneous to buy-order 
imbalances. A fourth explanation is that short sellers bear additional risk in period 
of elevated uncertainty. 
2.3. Regulation of Short Sale  
IOSCO 2003 Report on short sale, “Report on Transparency of Short 
Selling”, starts with an emphasis on potential benefits of short sale. The report 
states that;  
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Even where regulators consider that some aspects of short selling require 
regulation, they normally recognize that short selling can contribute to 
market efficiency. The potential benefits include: 
• helping to maintain efficient pricing by reversing, or containing, 
excessive valuations placed on security prices; 
• facilitating dealer liquidity provision, particularly where that service 
guarantees liquidity on a continuous basis; 
• providing a risk management tool for those needing to offset ‘long’ 
exposures;  
• keeping related prices properly aligned (through arbitrage); 
• assisting, within approved dealing and stabilization rules, with facilitating 
new issues; 
• facilitating the development of more complex and more sophisticated 
trading strategies (e.g. statistical arbitrage, pairs trading); 
• adding to overall liquidity and trading capacity. 
In addition, it is strongly stressed that short selling is frequently demonized 
on the basis of misconceptions. For instance, the inaccurateness of perception of 
short selling as costless speculation is emphasized. There are definitely significant 
costs and risks born by short sellers. Moreover, a person who shorts a stock is 
exposed to potentially substantial additional costs – theoretically, an unlimited loss 
- if the price of the shorted security rises rather than falls. Following these lines, the 
report draws attention to three main concerns of regulators on short selling,  
i) bring about disorderly markets 
ii) facilitate market abuse and  
iii) Settlement disruptions.  
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Regulators while appreciating the short selling role in effective price 
formation, concern about that speed and extent of corrections may themselves 
create disorders. The weight of short selling can intimidate other investors, cause 
them stand back and hold fresh buying orders away from markets.  
Either the process of decline or outcome of decline can create disorder. The 
disorder in process of decline can create volatility in the simplest term and thus 
mispricing in derivatives markets and eventually may lead to panic and market 
crashes. The outcome of decline may overshoot the efficient price level and this 
lead to mispricing of the stock itself. Second concern of regulators is that short 
selling may be used to assist market abuse. It doesn’t mean that short selling is 
abusive behavior but its ability to exacerbate price declines or to support insider 
dealers having negative information about an issuer, makes it useful tool for the 
people who intends to abuse market. Definition of manipulative activity varies 
between different jurisdictions. Clearly, behaviors intended to position prices, 
distort markets or mislead investors are accepted as market abuse irrespective of 
whether the selling is long or short. On the other hand, there are concerns that short 
selling may enhance the scope to carry out the abuse. Third concern of regulators is 
possible problems that short selling may create in the area of settlement. The 
principal issue here is buyer can get his/her stock in timely manner. Any delay in 
delivery may cause difficulties for instance, being able to exercise voting rights or 
to meet obligations on onward chain of transactions. If there is generally inadequate 
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enforcement to ensure the timely settlement of short sales, there may occur wider 
systemic risk. In addition, developments in supply and demand in the securities 
lending markets may remain short seller vulnerable to sudden shortages or the 
unexpected recall of stock. 
2.4. Regulatory Approaches and Tools 
Regulation over short sales aims at capturing the potential benefits of short 
selling (e.g. correcting an overvalued market, facilitating hedging and other risk 
management), while simultaneously reducing the scope for short selling to 
destabilize markets. IOSCO 2003 Report classifies regulations under three main 
areas and summarizes tools, objectives and observations as in following table.  
i) the types of securities that may, and may not, be sold short; 
ii) the processes by which short sales are executed; 
iii) settlement requirements of specific relevance to short selling. 
Table 2 Regulatory Tools 
Tools Objective Observations 
Restrict class of 
security eligible for 
short selling. 
Normally to reduce risk 
of disorder or 
manipulation in less 
Ban may further reduce 
liquidity and increase the risk 
of stock prices being inflated. 
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liquid securities, which 
are more volatile + 
easier to manipulate. 
Incentive to manipulate may 
not be high because rewards 
relatively low and stock to 
borrow generally scarce. 
Restrict short sales in 
individual securities 
when trading appears 
disorderly. 
To prevent disorder, 
including settlement 
disorder, but only 
where market 
monitoring shows this 
to be likely. 
Allows freedom to short sell 
in most circumstances. 
Imposition of ban may 
increase risk for those with 
open positions (and disrupt 
derivatives market). 
Restrict short sales in 
individual issues at 
sensitive times, e.g., 
takeovers, new issues. 
To protect issuers 
against manipulation 
that might adversely 
affect funding  
operations, etc. 
May reduce scope for 
manipulation, but may make 
price arbitrage less effective 
or could increase risk of 
offers being overpriced. 
Cap percentage of 
issue that may be sold 
short. 
A ceiling control 
designed to control 
excessive short selling. 
Ceiling level may restrict 
some ‘legitimate’ short sales 
and potentially facilitate an 
artificially high stock price. 
More difficult to enforce 
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when security trades in 
several locations. 
Rules to prevent short 
sales at sequentially 
lower prices. 
An aim to curb short 
selling’s capacity to 
drive prices rapidly 
lower. 
Blanket restrictions may 
interfere with hedging 
activity, but exemptions may 
change trading methods and 
their relative costs. 
Ban naked short sales. Aims to prevent 
settlement disruption 
and deter ‘free-ride’ 
speculation. 
Requires effective 
intermediary controls. 
No comparable controls on 
speculative longs. 
Require (customer) 
margin. 
Aims to protect broker 
and others involved in 
transaction against 
credit risk. 
Up-front margin may reduce 
short selling by increasing 
cost. May divert business via 
derivatives if margin costs in 
each market are out of line. 
In view of the financial crisis IOSCO formed a mandate of the Task Force 
to develop high-level principles for the effective regulation of short selling in 2009. 
This task force prepared another Report on short selling, in order to eliminate gaps 
18 
 
in various regulatory approaches to naked short selling, including delivery 
requirements and disclosure of short positions. It is emphasized that the new Report 
aimed at helping restore and maintain investor confidence under ongoing financial 
crisis, as the principles are formulated with a view to addressing the objectives of 
investor protection, helping to ensure that markets are fair, efficient and 
transparent, and reducing systemic risk. The IOSCO 2009 Report recommends four 
principles in order to ensure effective regulation of short selling. These are;  
i) Short selling should be subject to appropriate controls to reduce or 
minimize the potential risks that could affect the orderly and efficient 
functioning and stability of financial markets. 
ii) Short selling should be subject to a reporting regime that provides 
timely information to the market or to market authorities. 
iii) Short selling should be subject to an effective compliance and 
enforcement system. 
iv) Short selling regulation should allow appropriate exceptions for 
certain types of transactions for efficient market functioning and 
development.  
2.5 Countries’ Responses to Recent Financial Crisis  
IOSCO 2009 Report remarked that the countries with few controls are in 
Europe, while those with more controls are primarily in North America and Asia 
till recent financial crisis.  
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, regulators 
respond global financial crisis by announcing robust rescue plans for distressed 
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financial institutions. However, the markets didn’t get calm and stock prices 
continued to fall. After all, regulators reacted drastically by imposing tight new 
restrictions on the short selling of financial stocks. Frino et al. (2011) summarizes 
all regulatory responses in a way that firstly, on September 18, 2008, the FSA 
banned short-selling (both naked and covered) in financial stocks. The temporary 
ban, effective from September 19, 2008 to January 16, 2009, was for net short 
positions in 29 financial stocks on the London Stock Exchange. On the same day, 
the SEC imposed a similar ban on more than 800 financial stocks in the U.S. 
market which was later amended on 21 September and was set to expire on 2 
October, 2008. This was followed in Canada by the Ontario Securities Commission 
(OSC) for stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) that are also inter-
listed in the U.S. In Switzerland, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC), 
SWX and SWX Europe placed prohibitions on short-selling, coming into effect on 
19 September, 2008.  On 22 September 2008 Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) banned all forms of short-selling in all stocks; and Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Germany prohibiting naked 
short-selling for specified financial institutions. The next day, 23 September, 2008, 
the Italian regulator, Commossione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), 
placed a similar ban on naked short-selling of shares issued by banks and insurance 
companies. Following these, Russia and Korea were the next regulators, placing a 
prohibition on the short-selling of all securities. After a while, as markets 
worldwide began to stabilize regulators started to lift or release the restrictions. All 
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these reactions can be interpreted in a way that short selling behavior is seen as 
scapegoat during hard times and restrictions on short selling is primary tools used 
by regulators to stabilize markets.  
When we look at the regulation from broader perspective, in USA, there had 
been NYSE’s Uptick rule, and Nasdaq’s bid price test till 2005 SHO regulation. In 
2005, SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) established uniform locate and 
delivery requirements, and establish a procedure to temporarily suspend price tests 
for certain time periods in order to evaluate the overall effectiveness and necessity 
of short sale price restrictions. Later on, SEC removed all existing exchange-
mandated short-sale price test effective July 6, 2007. After crisis, SEC didn’t 
mandate price tests however adopted alternative up-tick rule. According to this new 
rule (Rule 201) restrictions on short selling would function only when a stock has 
triggered a circuit breaker by experiencing a price decline of at least 10 percent in 
one day. At that point, short selling would be permitted if the price of the security is 
above the current national best bid.
1
  
On the other hand, in Europe consisting of many jurisdictions, it took time 
to become a union wide regulation in view of recent financial crisis. The European 
Commission adopted on 15 September 2010 a proposal targeting short selling and 
credit default swaps. Besides other things relating to short selling, this proposal 
                                                          
1
 SEC press release at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-26.htm  
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brings: (1) a two-tiered disclosure regime and a flagging system, (2) the regulator’s 
empowerment to prohibit short sales of financial stocks temporarily and to 
introduce a circuit breaker, (3) a locate rule
2
, and (4) the obligation for trading 
venues to have buy-in procedures and fines for late settlement.  However market 
making activities are exempted from these rules. In the final text
3
 published on 24 
March 2012, the initial locate rule has been relaxed to allow intraday naked short-
selling. Similarly, a flagging system has been abandoned. This new regulation 
became directly effective in all Member States as of 1 November 2012.  
  
                                                          
2 In press release of European Commission with number MEMO/12/508 and date 29/06/2012, 
locate rule defined as “the arrangement whereby a broker confirms to a short seller that they have 
located the shares which the short seller needs to borrow to cover their short sale, taking into 
account the amount required and market conditions.” 
3
 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 March 2012 on 
short selling and certain aspects of Credit Default Swaps 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
SHORT SALE IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
3.1 Regulations in TURKEY  
Istanbul Exchange started its operation in 1986. The average daily trade 
volume was 8.9 million TL in 1988 and reached to 25 billion TL in 1994. In 
parallel to developments in market volumes, new regulations were required to 
prevent market abuse and ensure efficiency in markets. As a consequence, Capital 
Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) prepared new regulations relating to margin 
trading and short sale in late 1994. Communiqué on Margin Trading, Short Sales 
and Lending and Borrowing of Securities” (Serial V Number 18) came into effect 
12.27.1994 and defined short sale as “… sales of capital market instruments 
borrowed previously.” 
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Very first regulations of short sale required to borrow related stock before 
selling short, which is generally called covered short sale. In addition, it is required 
from investor to have % 50 initial margin. On the other hand there was no provision 
relating to maintenance margin. Another important provision on short sale was 
flagging requirement. It means that if you are selling short you have to inform your 
broker and he/she has to press short sale button while sending order to Exchange. 
This regulation provides information about volume of short sale for each stock and 
therefore serves both investors to capture signals of the market and regulators to 
monitor markets efficiently at the end of sessions. Last not but not least is price 
limitation, known as up-tick rule. This rule required that short sale should be 
executed at a price higher than the last execution price. However, short sale may be 
executed at a price equal to last execution price if this price is above the preceding 
price. 
In time, the practices in market had changed and CMB looked for more 
efficient monitoring and supervising mechanism over markets. As a result, 
aforementioned regulation was revised. Serial:V No:65 “Communiqué On Margin 
Trading, Short Sales and Lending And Borrowing of Securities” came into effect in 
July 2003. The fundamental change was about the definition of short sale. This 
time short sale was defined as, “…sales or placement of sale orders for capital 
market instruments that are not actually owned.” It is not necessary to borrow 
related stock before selling short anymore according to new definition. Thereafter, 
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along with covered short selling naked short selling is allowed in Turkish capital 
markets. 
The new Communique stipulates maintenance margin in addition to initial 
margin relating to short selling activities. According to new regulation, this has 
been in effect since 2003; 
“The customer has to deposit at least 50% margin at the beginning for 
the transaction of short sales. The initial margin means that the 
securities being subject to the short sale shall be deposited in cash in 
the amount of its current market value or the security shall be invested 
in cash. The minimum margin rate of 35% is obligatory in the course 
of short sale actions. The following formula shall be used in the 
calculation of the rate of equity capital:  
 [(current market value of the securities subject to the transactions – 
market value of capital market instrument subject to short sale)/ 
current market values of the securities subject to the transactions]” 
In addition to margin requirements, the regulation requires brokerage houses 
to flag each short selling while sending orders to Exchange. The provision titled 
“Notification of short sale order” states that; 
“The brokerage house shall clearly state to the Stock Exchange that 
the order is a short sale order in case of receipt of a short sale order in 
writing or in case a brokerage house discovers that a transaction is a 
short sale.” 
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Another fundamental rule regarding to short selling is price limit in 
transactions, with its worldwide known name, up-tick rule. In first version of the 
regulation, the provision which had been in effect till 02.01.2013 required that; 
“In cases where a brokerage house executes a short sale on behalf of 
its customer or on its own account, the short sale shall be executed at 
a price higher than the price at which the last trade of a security 
subject to short sale is executed. However, short sale may be affected 
at the price at which the last trade was executed, if such price is 
above the next preceding price.” 
Another restriction on short selling is put on related parties. The provision 
restricts the related parties of company engaged in short selling activity of the 
underlying stock. The rule states that; 
The members of the board of directors of the company issuing 
capital market instrument and their executives and the shareholders 
of the company owning 10% or higher rate of shares of the company 
as well as those discovered to act jointly with them and their spouses 
and those under their guardianship are banned from effecting short 
sales of capital market instrument of the said company.  
 
Till 2009, there hadn’t been any changes in regulation of short sales of 
CMB or Borsa İstanbul. At 08.01.2009 Borsa İstanbul published a circular and 
announced that sending short selling orders during opening sessions are banned in 
order to provide efficient price formation. Following this, at 23.07.2010 CMB 
published Board decisions stating that the stocks traded on Borsa İstanbul are 
classified into three groups basing on their liquidity and market capitalization. 
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Besides other things, according this decision the stocks in B and C group can’t be 
subject to margin trading or short sale. Previously, all stocks except traded in watch 
list companies market could be sold short. The purpose of this regulation was 
announced as providing market stability and preventing manipulative attempts.  
In August 2011, USA credit note was decreased under AAA for the first 
time in the history, and the concerns about EU debt crisis jumped to Spain and 
Italy. All exchanges experienced significant losses in that period as BIST-100 index 
decreased % 19 in first ten days of August. Following these developments, CMB 
announced that inspections would start towards transactions violating short selling 
regulations and the initial margin at short selling transactions was increased to from 
50 % 70 %. In this case CMB preferred to intervene to market indirectly and 
discouraged short selling by increasing initial margin ratios and inspections. 
Although the increase seems simply 20 %, it costs investors 2333 TL collateral for 
1000 TL short selling instead of 1000 TL due to the calculations of margin 
requirements. As it is explained previously, most of the short selling positions are 
covered in a day, which means this regulatory change might not effect short sellers 
severely. After pessimistic view about markets disappeared, in 31.07.2012 CMB 
announced that it removed its previous decision about an increase on initial margin 
at short selling and decided to continue with 50 % initial margin ratio. 
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  Just after 5 months after latest decision of CMB, there was a change in 
Communique Serial:V No:65. With this change CMB transfer its authority on 
implementing up-tick rule to Board of Borsa İstanbul. Following this change, Borsa 
İstanbul published a circular and announced that implementation of uptick rule was 
repealed as of 01.02.2013.   
3.2. Short Sale in TURKEY  
Short sale transactions are as old as stock markets. It is the most 
fundamental strategy in bear markets for investors. On the other hand, regulators 
make provisions against potential impacts of short sale in order to prevent market 
abuses and disorderly market functioning. The market trends as well as regulatory 
constraints on short sale have affected the nature of short sale. In Turkey short sale 
can be executed from the very first day of the stock markets and the first 
restrictions on short sale came into effect in 1994. The volume of the short sale is in 
line with both trends of the market and regulatory changes in Turkey. The figure 3 
shows the progress of daily total volume and short sale volume from January 2005 
to March 2014. In general total volume and short sale volume show similar trends. 
On the other hand, figure 4 shows ratio of daily short sale volume to total volume 
in percentage from January 2005 to March 2014. The ratio of daily short sale 
volume to total volume is around 2 % in 2005 while the average ratio increases to 
11.8 % in 2013 and around 16 % in the first quarter of 2014.  The highest ratio, 21, 
4 % realized on Jan 2, 2014. It is obvious that there is a break point at the beginning 
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of 2013 when the main constraint on short sale, uptick rule was repealed. The shift 
in 2013 can be seen more clearly in the figure 2 which depicts the progress of 
annual short sale volume in years. 
Figure 2 Annual Short Sale Volume 
 
Note: Graph shows total annual short sale volume from 2005 to 2013 
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Figure 3 Daily Total Volume and Short Sale Volume 
 
Note: Graph shows daily total volume and short sale volume from January 2005 to March 2014.  
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Figure 4 Share of Short Sale in Total Volume (%) 
 
Note: Graph shows ratio of daily short sale volume to total volume in percentage from January 2005 to March 2014. 
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3.3. Lending Market in TURKEY  
As discussed in first chapter, lending stocks is indispensable part of the 
short selling process. If investors don’t close their position intraday, they have to 
borrow the related stocks to accomplish settlement requirement in day t+2. In 
general the lending transactions are executed on over the counter markets. The 
brokerage house either borrows the related stock from its other customers’ 
accounts, generally institutional investors, or asks to borrow from other brokerage 
houses. In Turkey, in addition to over the counter markets, İstanbul Takas ve 
Saklama Bankası has operated an organized lending market since 2005. 
The data of organized lending market is regularly issued by Takasbank 
since 2006. The market has made significant progress since its establishment.  
The annual lending volume was 768 million TL in 2006 while it was 3,022 
million TL in 2013. On the other hand when we compare this lending data with 
short sale, it is seen that lending market can’t keep pace with short sale. In 
average 9 % of daily short sale volume is met by lending market in 2006 while 
this ratio falls to 3,61 %  in the first quarter of 2014.  It may be due to two 
reasons. Firstly, the organized lending market doesn’t work efficiently and the 
demand for this market is low and as a result investors prefer to borrow from over 
the counter markets. Secondly, the short sale positions are closed intraday and the 
need for borrowing the related stock to accomplish settlement requirement 
disappears. The figure 5 depicts the ratio of monthly lending volume to short sale 
volume since the beginning of January 2006. There are up and downs throughout 
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the period, however surprisingly the ratio falls significantly under average after 
January 2013. It is probably because although keeping its nominal level, lending 
volume can’t keep up with short sale volume jump after repeal of uptick rule.  
Figure 5 Ratio of Lending to Short Sale 
 
Source: İstanbul Takas ve Saklama Bankası A.Ş. 
Note: Graph shows ratio of monthly lending volume to short sale volume from January 2006 to 
March 2014.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
IMPACTS OF SHORT SELLING RESTRICTIONS ON 
MARKETS 
 
 
 
  There are abundant studies on effects of short selling restrictions on 
financial markets. The studies and debates on short selling can be categorized 
under three main pillar; overpricing, market quality and market governance. 
4.1. Role of Short Selling on Overpricing 
  The best known role of short selling on efficient financial markets is that 
short selling provides investors to reflect their negative opinions to financial 
markets without having the stock. Overpricing effect of short selling bans was 
firstly theorized by Miller (1977). He argues that in case of low, restricted or 
banned short selling, the price of a security is higher if there is greater divergence 
of opinion about the return of the security. According to Miller (1977), theory 
with heterogeneous expectations, risk neutral and equally informed investors 
assumptions, overpricing occurs in existence of (1) Short selling constraints (in 
 35 
 
the form of direct prohibition or increased costs) (2) heterogeneous opinions 
about stock’s performance. 
  An efficient market is defined as by Fama (1970) “…in which prices 
always fully reflect available information”. On the other hand, Miller states that 
the riskier assets (namely the ones with higher divergence of opinion) with short 
selling restrictions will be overpriced. In this regard, releasing short selling 
restrictions provides additional supply to the market and leads price down to the 
point where market is efficient. Miller (1977) states that  
“Because the number of people with extremely pessimistic 
evaluations of a stock are likely to increase with the divergence of 
opinion about a stock, short sales tend to moderate the tendency for 
riskier stocks to be bid up to higher prices” 
  There are many empirical studies testing Miller’s theory. The most used 
mean to test the argument is to identify a cross-section of stocks and to verify if 
short sales constrained stocks are overpriced and if overpricing rises with 
diverging opinions. 
  In empirical studies, there are many proxies used to measure whether short 
sale is constrained. Most available and commonly used proxy is short interest 
which is a ratio defined as [shares sold short / shares outstanding]. IOSCO 2003 
Report remarks three different perspectives on the expected relationship between 
short interest and stock returns. The first perspective is that short interest should 
bear a negative relation with stock returns. It assumes that informed traders are 
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more likely to engage in short selling, so high short interest conveys adverse 
information, implying a negative relationship between short interest and stock 
returns. An alternative perspective, popular in Wall Street, focuses on bullish 
signal of high level of short interest. It argues that short interest represents latent 
demand, which will transform eventually into actual purchase of the shares to 
cover the short position. The third perspective is that short selling may be much 
more related to hedging strategies, arbitrage transactions, and tax-related reasons 
instead of stock returns. The report states that  
“for example, traders may take short positions to implement 
techniques such as shorting against the box. To remove any price 
related uncertainty, a trader may sell short securities (usually for 
tax reasons) on which the trader already has a long position. Such 
short positions may not trigger any future demand for the shares 
nor are they motivated by short sellers’ negative information.” 
  Other proxies used in empirical studies are lending fee, institutional 
ownership and accessibility to options market. The divergence of opinion is 
assessed by either analysts’ forecasts (Diether et al, 2002) or standard deviation of 
returns (Boehme et al, 2006) 
  Most of the studies support Miller’s overpricing hypothesis with small 
differences. Boehme et al. (2006) examine the valuation effects of the interaction 
between differences of opinion and short sale constraint. They find robust 
evidence of significant overvaluation for stocks that are subject to both conditions 
simultaneously and stocks are not systematically overvalued if one of these 
conditions isn’t met. Desai et al. (2002) uses the population of monthly short 
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interest data over the period of June 1988 through December 1994 for NASDAQ 
market. They find statistically significant subsequent underperformance for 
heavily shorted firms. 
  Study of Asquith et al. (2005) uses short interest ratios (a proxy for 
demand) and institutional ownership ratios (as a proxy for supply) to investigate 
whether short sale constraints affect stock returns. They define short-sale 
constrained when there is a strong demand to sell short and a limited supply of 
shares to borrow. They find that the higher the short interest ratio, the lower is the 
subsequent performance and constrained stocks underperform during the period 
1988-2002 by a significant 215 basis point per month as measured by the 
intercepts from four-factor time-series regression models. Autore et al. (2006) 
examines the cross-sectional impact of the 2008 short sale ban on the returns of 
US financial stocks. They claim that in line with bans, stocks with larger liquidity 
declines are associated with poorer contemporaneous stock returns and report that 
valuation reversals whereby stocks with higher abnormal returns at the onset of 
the ban have lower abnormal returns at its removal. 
  Hu et al. (2009) examines the informational role played by short interest in 
stock price formation by using short sale data of the Taiwan Stock Exchange. 
They find that heavily shorted stocks generate significant and negative risk-
adjusted abnormal returns. Chang et al. (2007) examines the short sale constraints 
on Hong Kong market. They find that short-sales constraints tend to cause stock 
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overvaluation and the overvaluation effect is more dramatic for individual stocks 
for which wider dispersion of investor opinions exists. 
  As mentioned previously, short sale can be mimicked through option 
markets. By buying puts and writing calls we can take synthetic short sale 
positions. Boehme et al (2006) uses the presence of exchange-traded options to 
distinguish between short-sale constrained and unconstrained firms. Firms with 
traded options are presumed to be less short-sale constrained. The intuition behind 
options relaxing short-sale constraints is that options allow investors to take short 
positions in securities without short selling directly. In other words, investors who 
might short-sell at a relatively high cost can use options to synthetically short a 
security. 
  Miller’s theory assumes that investors are irrational, implying that some of 
the investors are willing to buy stocks at a price higher than efficient price. On the 
other hand, Diamond and Verechia (1987) put the debate into rational 
expectations framework and argue that if investors are aware of the market failure 
and systematically included it into the price, in other words, when short selling is 
banned, investors value stocks by keeping in mind that negative information isn’t 
reflected into prices, then there wouldn’t be any overpricing but constraint would 
affect speed of price adjustments to private information. Bris et al. (2007) studies 
effects of short sale restrictions on speed of price discovery, using data from 46 
countries and find that prices incorporate negative information faster in countries 
where short sale is allowed and practiced.   
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4.2. Role of Short Selling on Market Quality 
  Diamond and Verechia (1987) argue that short sale bans would increase 
bid-ask spread and hence affect market quality. Charoenrook and Daouk (2009) 
investigate the effects of market wide short sale restrictions on several variables 
for 111 countries and find that when investors engage in short selling activities, 
liquidity is increased. Boehmer et al. (2009) studies the effect of the short sale ban 
for financials in the US and finds that a decrease in trading volume. Similarly, 
Marsh and Payne (2011) show a decrease in liquidity in UK.  
  The most debatable issue of short sale is its effects on volatility. 
Regulators generally justify prohibitions by claiming that short sale has negative 
effect on volatility. On the other hand, the empirical studies tell different story.  
Bris et al. (2007) studies short sale restrictions in 59 countries and gets results that 
shortable index has 8 % lower standard deviation from non-shortable index. 
Furthermore Charoenrook and Daouk (2009) show that short sale have 0.05 lower 
standard deviation of monthly returns. Chang et al. (2007) documents higher 
volatility and less positive skewness of individual stock returns when short sales 
are allowed for Hong Kong Market. 
  Diether et al. (2009) studies the effect of short-sale price tests on market 
quality in US stock markets and finds no evidence for increase neither in returns 
nor in downside volatility for Pilot stocks after regulation SHO
4
 but finds that 
                                                          
4 Reg SHO dictates that short-sale price tests (up-tick rule for NYSE and bid price rule for 
Nasdaq) be suspended for a set of Pilot stocks starting May 2, 2005. 
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suspension of NYSE Uptick Rule is associated with a large and significant 
reduction in asymmetries of depth and order flow for Pilot stocks.  
4.3. Role of Short Selling on Market Governance 
  Short selling has been blamed during financial crisis or after financial 
crisis for pulling down prices further, leading to market crashes and exacerbating 
systemic risk. Studies analyze the skewness of stock return distributions and 
frequency of extremely negative returns in order to investigate short selling 
impact on market crashes. Bris et al (2007) examines the skewness of market 
returns and frequency of extreme negative returns in order to test whether short 
sale restrictions can reduce the severity of price declines. They find strong 
evidence that lifting of short sale restrictions is associated with increased negative 
skewness in the market returns. However, short sales have no significant impact 
on the frequency of crashes. Suffi and Sigurdson (2011) use stock lending data as 
a proxy for short selling constraints in 30 countries and find that relaxing short-
sales constraints is not associated with an increase in either price instability or the 
occurrence of extreme negative returns. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
IMPACTS OF SHORT SELLING RESTRICTIONS ON BORSA 
ISTANBUL 
 
 
 
5.1. Fama-French Three Factor Model 
  This study uses Fama-French Three Factor Model to investigate the 
impacts of short selling restrictions on Borsa İstanbul. Fama and French (1993) 
three factor asset pricing model was developed as a result of evidences that the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) performed poorly in explaining realized 
returns. Fama and French (1993) extended the Fama and French (1992) study by 
using a time-series regression approach. The analysis included both stocks and 
bonds. Monthly returns on stocks and bonds were regressed on five factors: 
returns on a market portfolio, a portfolio for size and a portfolio for the book-to-
market equity effect, a term premium and a default premium. While for stocks, 
the first three factors were significant, for bonds the last two factors had 
explanatory power.  As a result, Fama and French form a three factor asset pricing 
model for stocks that includes well-known market factor and two additional risk 
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factors related to size and book to market equity. They find that this expanded 
model captures much of the cross section of average returns amongst US stocks. 
The model says that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk free 
rate is explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors:  
  (i) the excess return on a broad market portfolio,  
  (ii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the 
return on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB) and  
  (iii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-
market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to- market stocks (HML).  
  The model is as follows: 
    -     = α +    (   -    ) +    (    ) +    (    ) +                         
  where:  
  (Rpt) is the weighted return on portfolio p in period t. 
  Rft is the risk-free rate; 
  ßp is the coefficient loading for the excess return of the market portfolio 
over the risk-free rate; 
  sp is the coefficient loading for the excess average return of portfolios with 
small equity class over portfolios of big equity class. 
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  hp is the coefficient loading for the excess average returns of portfolios 
with high book-to-market equity class over those with low book-to-market equity 
class. 
  εpt is the error term for portfolio p at time t. 
  While Fama & French (1992) uses Fama & Macbeth (1973) procedure, 
Fama & French (1993) employs the time-series regression method of Black et al. 
(1972). They interpret the slopes of these regressions as sensitivities to the 
factors. Using this approach provides to reveal the causes of common variation in 
average returns as well as interpreting the slopes and R
2
 values. In addition, they 
examine the cross-sectional implications of different factor combinations in their 
study and analyze the intercepts (Jensen’s alpha) of the regressions which 
measure the abnormal return on a stock or portfolio. It is expected that the 
intercepts are statistically indifferent from zero which prove that the factors are 
able to explain the cross-section of average returns. 
  Akdeniz et al. (2000) is the first paper studying the cross-sectional 
variation in stock returns for the Turkish market. They use Fama & French (1992) 
approach and make some changes in the estimation method due to small number 
of stocks and the short period of investigation. Their findings indicate that book-
to-market ratio and firm size explain stock returns however market beta has no 
explanatory power even in the models where it is the only variable in the model. 
The working research paper by Aksu & Onder (2003) employs the Fama & 
French (1993) methodology and finds a relatively strong size effect and a weak 
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BE/ME effect for the Turkish market for the 1993-1997 period. A more recent 
and extended study by Yuksel et al. (2010) uses both Fama & French (1992) and 
Fama & French (1993) procedures for analyzing the period between 2000 and 
2007 and include the liquidity as an additional risk factor in the model. Their 
findings show that three-factor model has more explanatory power compared to 
the CAPM and adding the liquidity factor to the model increases its explanatory 
power even more. The master thesis prepared by Akdağ (2011) extends the period 
between 1997 and 2010 and tries to determine the common risk factors that 
capture the variation in stock returns. In this study, an additional factor (FIP) is 
introduced and used to measure the effect of foreign investor participation on the 
common variation in stock returns in the Turkish market. The results of the study 
indicates that three-factor model is superior to the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
although the effects of size and book-to-market factors are weak while the 
inclusion of the foreign investor participation factor improves the explanatory 
power of the Fama & French model only slightly.  
There are limited studies investigating short sale in Turkish markets. 
Aksoy and Dastan (2011) study short selling activities in relation to the day of the 
week effect and the weekend effect for the period 2005-2009 in Istanbul Stock 
Exchange. They cannot find direct evidence that speculative short sellers close 
out their position on Friday and reopen their position on the following Monday, 
hence, adding to the weekend effect however find positive correlation between 
the short selling and the returns for all days of the week. Another study is 
Çankaya et al. (2011) focusing on the interrelation between short selling and 
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volatility for Borsa İstanbul. They demonstrate that the effects of short selling 
activity change during the two sessions of the day and the rest of trading hours. 
The only study investigating impacts of short sale restrictions on Borsa İstanbul is 
unpublished proficiency thesis (Eken, 2013) submitted to Capital Markets Board 
of Turkey. This study finds that amendment in margin requirement for short sale 
led to decrease in trade volume and find no evidence for volatility decrease after 
amendment.    
5.2. Data and Methodology 
  This study focuses on the period between January 2012 and March 2014 
for investigating the impacts of short selling restrictions on prices of stocks traded 
at Borsa Istanbul. In particular, uptick rule was repealed as of February 2013 for 
Borsa Istanbul and this study aims to explore the possible pricing impacts of this 
amendment. 
Unlike many previous studies, financial firms such as banks, holding 
companies, investment trusts and insurance companies are included into the 
sample. Some studies employing Fama French three factor models exclude 
financial firms from the sample since it is assumed that the highly levered capital 
structure of these firms would distort the results. In Fama and French (1992), they 
argue that “We exclude financial firms because the high leverage that is normal 
for these firms probably does not have the same meaning as for nonfinancial 
firms, where high leverage more likely indicates distress.” On the other hand, 
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there is no leverage factor in the 1993 paper. Financials were included in their 
factor calculation then and all portfolios on French’s website currently include 
financials. Moreover, Barber and Lyon (1997) show that the relationship between 
security returns, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio is similar for financial 
and nonfinancial firms and Baek and Bilson (2014) argue that size and value risk 
premium commonly exists in both nonfinancial and financial firms, even if two 
factors are less explicable in financial firms. So, this study employs data of all 
stocks traded at Borsa Istanbul except the ones with negative book value in order 
to measure the book-to-market effect accurately. The number of companies in the 
sample ranges from a minimum of 346 to a maximum of 381 after modifications 
in the period.  
  The daily stock prices, daily volume, daily short sale volume, market 
value, book-to-market ratio and BIST 100 index are obtained from Borsa İstanbul. 
Book-to- market ratio is calculated monthly by Borsa İstanbul using market value 
(=Paid-in Capital * Latest Closing Price) and book value (Capital issued at most 
recent financial statement). The daily stock prices are the closing prices adjusted 
for stock splits, cash dividends and stock dividends. The BIST-100 index values 
are used as a proxy for the market portfolio. The weekly returns for these 
variables are calculated using percentage method instead of the logarithmic 
difference. The weekly returns are calculated from Monday to next Monday. If 
Monday is holiday, the data of closest upcoming business day is used in place of 
Monday. For risk free rate, overnight interbank rates from the Central Bank of 
Turkey website or datasets derived from the returns of the irregularly issued 
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treasury bills are generally used.  However, overnight interbank rates misestimate 
risk free rate during distressed time and irregularity of issuance of treasury bills 
cause a problem for accurate proxy. This study uses daily data of annual interest 
rates calculated by using government bonds traded at Borsa İstanbul. Annual rates 
are transformed into weekly rates.  
  Pricing ability of four explanatory variables is investigated in this study. 
Among these, excess market return is formed independently from the portfolio 
context. The market factor is simply the difference between the return on the 
BIST-100 index and the risk-free T-bill rate. 
  The Fama French factors, SMB and HML are constructed using the 6 
portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. SMB (small minus big) proxies the 
size effect whereas HML (high minus low) proxies the book-to-market effect. In 
order to construct these variables six portfolios are formed in a way that the 
stocks are first sorted on size in the end of each quarter, from 2011/4 to 2013/4, 
and divided into two groups called small and big (S and L). Then these groups are 
sub-divided into three BE/ME groups where the stocks within the lowest BE/ME 
fraction (30%) are called low (L); the stocks in the middle (40%) are named 
medium (M); and the stocks with highest book-to-market ratio (30%) are defined 
as high (H). Hence six portfolios are created (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M, B/H); 
which contain stocks in different size and BE/ME groups. The SMB factor is 
calculated for each week by calculating the difference between the average 
returns on small portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H) and the average returns on big 
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portfolios (B/L, B/M, B/H). The HML is similarly the difference between the 
average weekly returns on the high (S/H, B/H) and low (S/L, B/L) portfolios.  
  In this study the impacts of short sale restrictions are investigated by two 
different ways. Firstly daily shorts sale volume / total volume ratios (SSV/TV) are 
calculated in order to explore whether portfolios of stocks highly shorted 
generally underperform the market. (As measured by Jensen’s alpha, the 
intercepts from three -factor time-series regression models) In this regard, all 
stocks are sorted according to their short sale ratio, SSV/TV and then grouped 
into 4 portfolios. The portfolios are formed with benchmarks, (i) less than 1% (ii) 
between 1 % and 2.5 % (iii) between 2.5 % and 5 % and iv) more than 5 %  in the 
period between 01.02.2012 and 02.04.2013. As it is seen in figure 4 that after 
uptick rule was repealed the average ratio of SSV/TV jumped significantly. 
Because of that, the portfolios are reset with new benchmarks, (i) less than 3 % 
(ii) between 3 % and 7 % (iii) between 7 % and 11 % and iv) more than 11 %  in 
the period after repeal of uptick rule. In parallel with forming SMB and HML 
portfolios, short sale portfolios are updated quarterly by taking the quarter 
average SSV/TV ratios into consideration. After forming portfolios the weekly 
returns of each portfolio is calculated by taking an average of returns of individual 
stocks. The time-series tests are performed with the portfolios. The dependent 
variables for all model specifications are the excess returns (Rit – Rft) of these four 
portfolios. 
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  In order to investigate the impacts of short sale on prices, in addition to 
SMB and HML factors, this study investigates if short sale is an additional 
explanatory variable in Fama French factor model. In order to check this 
hypothesis, the difference between returns of most shorted portfolio (stocks in 4th 
portfolio) and the least shorted portfolio (stocks in 1st portfolio) is calculated 
weekly and called SS. The alternative models with different factors, including SS, 
are regressed before and after repeal of uptick rule.  
5.3. Descriptive Statistics  
  The data set used in this study reveals the following descriptive statistics 
at a first glance. The data period covers from January 2012 to March 2014. Table 
4 presents descriptive statistics of short sale portfolios before and after period. In 
first period covering January 2012- January 2013, there are 55 weeks while there 
are 60 weeks in second period covering February 2013- March 2014. 
Mean returns of short sale portfolios are all positive before repeal of short 
sale while mean return of all but third portfolio are negative in the second period. 
Table 4 shows that the range of mean returns of short sale portfolios is from -6.59 
% to 7.87 % before repeal of short sale while it is from -16.99 % to 9.42 % in the 
second period. Correspondingly the standard deviations of short sale portfolios in 
first period are lower compared to second period and in each interval standard 
deviation of returns increases with short sale ratios.  
  It is apparent from Table 4 that skewness values of short sale portfolios 
are negative and skewed to the left after repeal of short sale. This indicates that 
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return distributions of these portfolios consist of mainly small positive returns and 
rarely big negative returns. On the other hand, all but third short sale portfolios in 
first period have positive skewness values. 
In table 3, there is descriptive statistics for SS and SmB before and after 
repeal of uptick rule. The average of SS and SMB are positive in before period 
while getting negative in after period. 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of SS 
 SS SmB 
 Before After Before After 
Mean 0.114 -0.110 0.357 -0.021 
Median 0.208 -0.017 0.354 0.034 
Standard Dev. 1.683 1.915 1.439 1.119 
Kurtosis 0.627 1.130 5.353 -0.002 
Skewness 0.011 -0.708 1.278 0.166 
Range 8.604 9.558 9.261 5.619 
Minimum -4.262 -5.745 -2.701 -2.521 
Maximum 4.341 3.812 6.560 3.098 
Count 
 
55 60 55 60 
Note: Before period covers January 2012 to January 2013 when after period covers February 2013 
to March 2014. 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of Returns of Short Sale Portfolios before and after period. (%) 
    
Before 02/01/2013 After 02/01/2013 
  ISE 100 Portfolio1 Portfolio2 Portfolio3 Portfolio4 Portfolio1 Portfolio2 Portfolio3 Portfolio4 
Mean 0.311 0.382 0.507 0.465 0.496 -0.071 -0.063 0.156 -0.534 
Median 0.509 0.116 0.670 0.272 -0.149 0.498 0.318 0.500 -0.513 
Std  Dev. 3.650 1.701 1.962 2.181 2.805 3.045 3.623 3.997 4.858 
Kurtosis 2.592 0.797 0.334 -0.285 0.723 4.554 4.388 4.651 1.944 
Skewness -0.741 0.074 -0.052 0.213 0.520 -1.595 -1.595 -1.536 -0.755 
Range 24.426 9.143 9.611 9.831 14.470 18.033 21.332 23.478 26.417 
Minimum -15.018 -4.291 -4.528 -3.903 -6.595 -12.571 -14.989 -14.708 -16.993 
Maximum 9.408 4.852 5.084 5.927 7.875 5.462 6.342 8.770 9.423 
Count 115 55 55 55 55 60 60 60 60 
Av. Size (in bil.) - 593 1,039 1,735 6,079 602 1,770 2,831 9,963 
Av. BE/ME 
- 0.98 0.94 1.02 0.80 0.95 0.85 1.01 0.71 
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Figure 6 Return of Portfolio 1 and Portfolio 4 
 
Note: Graph shows weekly returns of least shorted stocks (portfolio 1) and most shorted stocks (portfolio 4) throughout all period.
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 Figure 6 presents weekly returns of 1
st
 portfolio (least shorted stock) and 4
th
 
portfolio (most shorted stocks) before and after repeal of uptick rule. It is seen that 
after repeal of uptick rule both portfolios become more volatile and up and downs 
for both of them get sharpened. On the other hand, the return of 4th portfolio, 
consisting of stocks heavily shorted has higher volatility throughout both periods. 
5.4. Regression Results  
 5.4.1 Three Factor Model with Different Short Sale Portfolios 
  As it is stated previously, this study firstly investigates whether highly 
shorted portfolios of stocks underperform the market. In this regard, all stocks are 
sorted according to their SSV/TV ratios and then grouped into 4 portfolios. The 
portfolios are formed with benchmarks, (i) less than 1% (ii) between 1 % and 2.5 % 
(iii) between 2.5 % and 5 % and iv) more than 5 %  before repeal of uptick rule.  By 
considering significant increase of short sale volume after repeal of uptick rule the 
portfolios are reset with new benchmarks, (i) less than 3 % (ii) between 3 % and 7 % 
(iii) between 7 % and 11 % and iv) more than 11. The time-series tests are 
performed with these portfolios before and after period.  
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  This study employs following time-series regression method of Fama & 
French (1993) by using excess return of four different short sale portfolios as 
dependent variable.  
    -     = α +    (   -    ) +    (    ) +    (    ) +                         
  Table 5 and 6 summarize the results of regressions for short sale portfolios 
before and after period. The coefficients on the market factor (betas) for all 
portfolios are highly significant where all p values are very close to zero. 
Furthermore, the betas are always below 1 for all portfolios in before period while in 
after period the beta exceeds 1 in 4
th
 portfolio. In addition it is seen that in both 
period the beta coefficient increases with the level of short sale. In before period the 
beta of 1
st
 portfolio, consisting of stocks slightly shorted is 0.561 while it converges 
to 1 for 4
th
 portfolio consisting of highly shorted stocks. Similarly, in the after period 
the market factor, beta increases from 0.716 to 1.078 while short sale ratio of 
portfolio increases. It shows that comparatively highly shorted stocks have more 
tendencies to respond to swings in the market. For 4
th
 portfolio in both period betas 
is very close to 1, indicating that these stocks are very vulnerable to market 
movements. Size factor (SmB) is significant for 2
nd
 and 4
th
 portfolios in before 
period at 5 % significant level while it is significant for all but 4th portfolio in after 
period.  The negative coefficient of SmB indicates that in a given period the large 
caps outperformed small ones. HmL factor is significant only for 4
th
 portfolio in 
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before period and it is significant for 3
rd
 portfolio in the after period. The negative 
coefficient of HmL indicates that in a given period growth stocks outperformed 
value stocks. 
  The adjusted-R
2
 values indicate the percentage of common variation in stock 
returns that is explained by each model for each portfolio. Thus, it is a variable used 
as a direct evidence for comparing the performance of different models. The R
2 
is 
around 0.65 in before period while it jumps to 0.70’s for first three portfolios and to 
0.91 to 4
th
 portfolio in second period.  
  Another remarkable point is significance of Jensen’s alphas. Boehme et al. 
(2006) and Asquith et al. (2005) consider Jensen’s alpha to test if there is under or 
overvaluation for different short sale portfolios. If Jensen’s alpha is significant and 
positive it indicates overvaluation and if it is significant and negative it indicates 
undervaluation. In this study all Jensen’s alpha but the 4th portfolio in after period is 
insignificant indicating that there is no under or overvaluation in these portfolios. On 
the other hand, in the after period the 4
th
 portfolio, consisting heavily shorted stocks 
has the only significant and negative Jensen’s alpha. These results indicate that the 
presence of uptick rule doesn’t tend to cause stock overvaluation, however after 
repeal of uptick rule heavily shorted stocks underperform probably because of 
reflection of the pessimists’ beliefs as short positions which drive asset prices down 
unnecessarily.  
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Table 5 Regression results before repeal of uptick rule 
 α Rm SmB HmL R2 
1
st
 portfolio -0.013 
(0.92) 
0.561 
(0.00) 
-0.142 
(0.19) 
-0.159 
(0.28) 
.67 
 
2
nd
 portfolio 0.097 
(0.58) 
0.620 
(0.00) 
-0.250 
(0.06) 
-0.146 
(0.41) 
.64 
3
rd
 portfolio 0.019 
(0.92) 
0.673 
(0.00) 
-0.186 
(0.22) 
-0.129 
(0.53) 
.62 
4
th
 portfolio 0.040 
(0.87) 
0.947 
(0.00) 
-0.435 
(0.02) 
-0.494 
(0.05) 
.66 
This table summarizes the results of the following regressions for the period from December 2012 to 
February 2013  
     -     = α +    (   -    ) +    (    ) +    (    ) +                         
where Rit is the weighted return on portfolio p in period t; Rft is the risk-free rate; ßi is the coefficient 
loading for the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate; si is the coefficient 
loading for the excess average return of portfolios with small equity class over portfolios of big 
equity class; h is the coefficient loading for the excess average returns of portfolios with high book-
to-market equity class over those with low book-to-market equity class and εit is the error term for 
portfolio i at time t. The values in paranthesis are p-values and R
2
 is the adjusted r-squared value. 
 
Table 6 Regression Results after repeal of uptick rule 
 α Rm SmB HmL R2 
1
st
 portfolio 0.056 
(0.75) 
0.716 
(0.00) 
-1.014 
(0.00) 
-0.056 
(0.75) 
.80 
 
2
nd
  portfolio 0.088 
(0.69) 
0.837 
(0.00) 
-1.004 
(0.00) 
-0.045 
(0.83) 
.79 
3
rd
 portfolio 0.261 
(0.34) 
0.837 
(0.00) 
-0.832 
(0.01) 
0.560 
(0.04) 
.74 
4
th
 portfolio -0.322 
(0.09) 
1.078 
(0.00) 
-0.084 
(0.67) 
0.040 
(0.83) 
.91 
This table summarizes the results of the following regressions for the period from February 2013 to 
March 2014. 
     -     = α +    (   -    ) +    (    ) +    (    ) +                         
where Rit is the weighted return on portfolio p in period t; Rft is the risk-free rate; ßi is the coefficient 
loading for the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate; si is the coefficient 
loading for the excess average return of portfolios with small equity class over portfolios of big 
equity class; hi is the coefficient loading for the excess average returns of portfolios with high book-
to-market equity class over those with low book-to-market equity class and εit is the error term for 
portfolio i at time t. The values in paranthesis are p-values and R
2
 is the adjusted r-squared value.  
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5.4.2. Four Factor Model with Short Sale Ratio 
  SmB and HmL factors are seen as proxies for risks not captured by CAPM 
beta. By introducing an additional proxy variable, SS, to the three-factor model, this 
section intends to test whether short sale is additional common risk factor at Borsa 
İstanbul before and after repeal of uptick rule.  The effect of the short sale on the 
average returns is tested because if some stocks are more shorted than others it 
means that some investors have negative views about these stocks, indicating that 
there is some additional risk factor relating to short sale.   
SS is the difference between returns of most heavily shorted portfolio (stocks 
in 4
th
 portfolio) and the least shorted portfolio (stocks in 1
st
 portfolio).  Table 7 
presents the regression results where the story about short sale impacts gains 
different perspective.   
  The following models are regressed for both before and after the repeal of 
uptick rule.  
     -      = α +    (   -    ) +                               (1) 
     -    ) = α +    (   -    ) +    (    ) +    (    ) +                        (2) 
     -      = α +    (   -    ) +    (    ) +    (   ) +                           (3) 
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     -      = α +    (   -    ) +    (    ) +    (   ) +                          (4) 
     -      = α +    (   -    ) +    (   )  +                                    (5) 
     -      =α+  (   -    )+  (    )+  (    )+  (   )+                    (6) 
  Table 7 presents the results of different regression models for both after and 
before period of repeal of uptick rule. In the before period, (1)
st
 regression states that 
market factor and size factor have explanatory power while book-to-market factor 
doesn’t. When we add short sale as a fourth explanatory factor to this model, short 
sale factor replace the size factor.  In the (5)
th
 regression, coefficients of market 
factor and short sale factor are significant while size factor loses its explanatory 
power and still coefficient of HmL is insignificant. Since uptick rule requires that 
the short sale shall be executed at a price higher than the latest execution price, it 
gets difficult to sell short illiquid small size stocks. Probably because of this reason 
in the before period, stocks in highly shorted portfolio and size portfolios are more 
or less same stocks and short sale factor replaces size factor in the regression. In the 
after period, presented in table 8, likewise first period (1)
st
 regression, market factor 
and size factor have explanatory power while book-to-market factor doesn’t. 
However different from before period when short sale is added to model as an 
explanatory factor, market factor and size factor still keep their significance and 
short sale is significant also. It means that this time short sale factor doesn’t replace 
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the size factor and has its independent explanatory power from size.  It indicates that 
when uptick rule is repealed the short sale factor doesn’t mimic size factor anymore, 
in other words highly shorted stocks aren’t just big size stocks anymore. And in the 
second period when the ratio of daily short sale volume to total volume is around 11 
%, SS factor which is the difference between returns of highly and slightly shorted 
stocks gains explanatory power in explaining common variation in stock returns.  
Table 7 Regression results before repeal of uptick rule 
Rp-Rf α Rm SmB HmL SS R2 
1 
 
-0.100 
(0.54) 
0.646 
(0.00) 
   .68 
2 
0.005 
(0.97) 
0.700 
(0.00) 
-0.253 
(0.04) 
(-0.232) 
(0.17) 
 .71 
3 
-0.015 
(0.92) 
0.566 
(0.00) 
0.124 
(0.23) 
 0.269 
(0.01) 
.74 
4 
-0.053 
(0.73) 
0.562 
(0.00) 
 -0.024 
(0.86) 
0.288 
(0.01) 
.73 
5 
-0.055 
(0.72) 
0.556 
(0.00) 
  0.290 
(0.01) 
.73 
6 
0.012 
(0.93) 
0.604 
(0.00) 
0.180 
(0.14) 
-0.148 
(0.36) 
0.249 
(0.02) 
.74 
This table summarizes the results of regressions for the period from January 2013 to March 2014. 
The values in parenthesis are p-values and R
2
 is the adjusted r-squared value. 
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Table 8 Regression results after repeal of uptick rule 
Rp-Rf α Rm SmB HmL SS R2 
1 
 
0.047 
(0.82) 
0.684 
(0.00) 
   .76 
2 
0.049 
(0.78) 
0.801 
(0.00) 
-0.937 
(0.00) 
-0.025 
(0.88) 
 .84 
3 
-0.094 
(0.53) 
0.947 
(0.00) 
-0.564 
(0.01) 
 -0.396 
(0.00) 
.88 
4 
-0.142 
(0.39) 
0.935 
(0.00) 
  -0.519 
(0.00) 
.86 
5 
-0,147 
(0.16) 
0.934 
(0.05) 
 0.049 
(0.16) 
-0,521 
(0.08) 
.86 
6 
-0.101 
(0.51) 
0.945 
(0.00) 
-0.566 
(0.01) 
0.064 
(0.66) 
-0.398 
(0.00) 
.89 
This table summarizes the results of regressions for the period from January 2013 to March 2014. 
The values in parenthesis are p-values and R
2
 is the adjusted r-squared value. 
 
5.4.3 Robust Checks 
Dummy variables can be used in time series regressions to test the structural 
stability of parameters. In previous sections, it reveals that there is breakdown at the 
causes of common variation in average returns before and after repeal of uptick rule. 
This time, dummy variable is used to compare parameter estimates before versus 
after the repeal of uptick rule. To this end, following model is specified; 
     -      =    +     (   -    ) +    (    ) +     (    ) +     *d  +      (   - 
   )*d +     (    )*d +     (    )*d +                 
 
In this case, we define a dummy variable, d=0 for observations before repeal 
of uptick rule and set d=1 for observations after period for each of four short sale 
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portfolios.   ,              are the coefficients which estimate the difference between 
two periods. Table 9 presents the results of regression models with dummy variables 
for both after and before repeal of uptick rule with four short sale portfolios. 
According to regression results,    and     are insignificant parameters which 
indicate there is no structural change for Jensen’s alpha and market coefficient. 
However, for the first three short sale portfolios, size factor coefficient,     is 
insignificant, while      which is coefficient of size factor with dummy variable 
becomes significant for the first three short sale portfolios. On the other hand, for 
fourth short sale portfolio consisting heavily shorted stocks, size factor coefficient, 
    is significant, while   , coefficient of size factor with dummy variable is 
insignificant. First of all, results indicate that there is a structural change before 
versus after repeal of uptick rule at size coefficient. Additionally, the results are 
substantially compatible with the arguments presented in section “5.4.1 Three Factor 
Model with Different Short Sale Portfolios” where size factor (SmB) is significant 
for 2
nd
 and 4
th
 portfolios in before period at 5 % significant level while it is 
significant for all but 4th portfolio in after period.  
Additionally, regression of four factor models with short sale ratio with 
dummy variables is run in order to explore possible structural change after repeal of 
uptick rule. A dummy variable, d=0 is defined for observations before repeal of 
uptick rule and set d=1 for observations after period. The following model is 
regressed; 
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     -      =  +   (   -    )+   (    )+   (    )+   (   )+    *d  +     (   - 
   )*d +   (    )*d+   (    )*d+   (   )*d +                          
Table 10 presents the results of regression of four factor model with short 
sale ratio with dummy variables. It reveals that                    are all 
insignificant, indicating there is no structural change at Jensen’s alpha, market 
coefficient, growth factor and short sale factor. However while size factor     is 
insignificant,      coefficient factor with dummy variable becomes significant 
showing that there is a breakdown at size factor before and after repeal of uptick 
rule. The results are significantly in parallel with the regression results presented 
under the title of “5.4.2. Four Factor Model with Short Sale Ratio”.  
  
 
 
 
 
    Table 9 Regression results with dummy variable with four short sale portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     This table summarizes the results of the following regression for the period from December 2012 to March 2014 with dummy variable 
     where d=0 for observations before repeal of uptick rule and set d=1 for observations after period for 4 short sale portfolios. 
          -      = α +     (   -    ) +    (    ) +     (    ) +  α*d  +      (   -    )*d +     (    )*d +     (    )*d +                 
 
    The values in parenthesis are p-values and R
2
 is the adjusted r-squared value. 
 
  
 α Rm SmB HmL α*d Rm*d SmB*d HmL*d R2 
1
st
 portfolio -0.013 
(0.93) 
0.561 
(0.00) 
-0.142 
(0.24) 
-0.159 
(0.37) 
0.117 
(0.59) 
0.089 
(0.26) 
-0.855 
(0.00) 
0.086 
(0.69) 
.77 
 
2
nd
  portfolio 0.097 
(0.65) 
0.620 
(0.00) 
-0.250 
(0.11) 
-0.146 
(0.50) 
-0.115 
(0.69) 
0.166 
(0.10) 
-0.853 
(0.00) 
0.109 
(0.70) 
.74 
3
rd
  portfolio -0.019 
(0.93) 
0.673 
(0.00) 
-0.186 
(0.26) 
-0.129 
(0.57) 
0.097 
(0.75) 
0.160 
(0.14) 
-0.795 
(0.00) 
0.121 
(0.68) 
.75 
4
th
  portfolio - 0.040 
(0.86) 
0.947 
(0.00) 
-0.435 
(0.01) 
-0.494 
(0.03) 
0.073 
(0.81) 
-0.012 
(0.90) 
-0.231 
(0.39) 
0.715 
(0.02) 
.81 
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    Table 10 Four factor model regression results with dummy variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    This table summarizes the results of the following regression for the period from December 2012 to March 2014 with dummy variable 
   where d=0 for observations before repeal of uptick rule and set d=1 for observations after period for four factor model.  
 
         -      =α+   (   -    )+   (    )+   (    )+   (   )+  α*d  +     (   -    )*d +   (    )*d+   (    )*d+   (   )*d +                         
 
   The values in parenthesis are p-values and R
2
 is the adjusted r-squared value. 
 
 
 
 α Rm SmB HmL SS α*d Rm*d SmB*d HmL*d SS*d R2 
1 0.012 
(0.94) 
0.604 
(0.00) 
-0.180 
(0.19) 
-0.148 
(0.43) 
0.249 
(0.04) 
0.041 
(0.86) 
0.177 
(0.10) 
-0.780 
(0.00) 
0.154 
(0.54) 
-0.180 
(0.33) 
.82 
 
2 0.006 
(0.97) 
0.700 
(0.00) 
-0.253 
(0.06) 
-0.232 
(0.21) 
 0.043 
(0.86) 
0.100 
(0.25) 
-0.683 
(0.00) 
0.258 
(0.29) 
 .81 
3 -0.015 
(0.93) 
0.566 
(0.00) 
-0.124 
(0.29) 
 0.269 
(0.02) 
0.070 
(0.77) 
0.214 
(0.02) 
-0.835 
(0.00) 
 -0.199 
(0.27) 
.82 
6
4
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Short sale can be executed from the very first day of Borsa İstanbul while the 
first restrictions on short sale came into effect in 1994 and were updated in 2003. 
Besides other provisions, uptick rule, requiring execution of short sale at a price 
higher than the last execution price, was the most discussed rule and significant 
factor at determining short sale incentives. Uptick rule was repealed as of 
02.01.2013 for all markets in Borsa İstanbul. After this date, it is observed that share 
of short sale volume in total volume jumped significantly. This study basically aims 
to discover impacts of short sale restrictions, particularly repeal of uptick rule, on 
returns of stocks and explore the possible role of short sale at explaining the causes 
of common variation in average returns. 
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Firstly, Fama-French three factor model is regressed with four short sale 
portfolios before and after period. The coefficients on the market factor, namely 
betas for all portfolios are significant and increase with the level of short sale in both 
period. In before period the beta of 1
st
 portfolio, consisting of stocks slightly 
shorted, is 0.561 while it converges to 1 for 4
th
 portfolio, consisting of highly 
shorted stocks. Similarly, in the after period the market factor, beta increases from 
0.716 to 1.078 for short sale portfolios. It shows that comparatively highly shorted 
stocks have more tendencies to respond to swings in the market. In addition, the 
adjusted-R
2
 values are around 0.65 in before period while it jumps to 0.70’s for first 
three portfolios and to 0.91 to 4
th
 portfolio in second period. This indicates that 
Fama-French three factor model’s explanatory power on common variation in stock 
returns increases after repeal of uptick rule. In addition, Boehme et al (2006) and 
Asquith et al (2005) consider Jensen’s alpha to test if there is under or overvaluation 
for different short sale portfolios. This study explores that all jensen’s alpha in 
before period and all jensen’s alpha but the 4th portfolio in after period are 
insignificant indicating that there is no under or overvaluation in these portfolios. 
Regression results show that the presence of uptick rule doesn’t tend to cause stock 
overvaluation, however after repeal of uptick rule heavily shorted stocks 
underperform probably because of reflection of the pessimists’ beliefs as short 
positions which drive asset prices down unnecessarily. The results are consistent 
with another study working on short sale in another emerging market. Hu et al. 
(2009) also find that that heavily shorted stocks generate significant and negative 
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risk-adjusted abnormal returns in Taiwan stock market. These results partially 
confirm regulators concern that short sale may exacerbate price declines and hence 
lead mispricing of the stock itself. 
Secondly, this study investigates the possible role of short sale at explaining 
the causes of common variation in average returns before and after repeal of uptick 
rule. SS, formed as the difference between returns of most heavily shorted portfolio 
and the least shorted portfolio, is added as an explanatory variable to Fama French 
factor model for both before and after period. The regression results indicate that in 
before period when short sale factor is added to model, it is significant however size 
factor becomes insignificant which means short sale factor replaces size factor. The 
short sale factor substitutes size factor since uptick rule requires execution of short 
sale at a price higher than the latest execution price, which indicates it gets difficult 
to sell short illiquid small size stocks while large, liquid stocks are more convenient 
to sell short. However, after repeal of uptick rule when short sale is added to as an 
additional explanatory variable to model, market factor and size factor keep their 
significance and short sale is significant also. It means that short sale factor doesn’t 
replace the size factor anymore and has its independent explanatory power from 
size.  It is probably because in absence of uptick rule it gets easier to sell short 
comparatively illiquid stocks and highly shorted stocks don’t consist of only large 
stocks anymore.  
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The findings in this thesis have direct implications for market practitioners as 
well as regulators. One of the most outstanding implication is that short sale 
restrictions, particularly uptick rule have negative impact on volume.  In addition 
when we sort stocks according to their short sale volume, it reveals that 
comparatively heavily shorted stocks are more vulnerable to market swings, which 
makes them riskier. Furthermore, when we look at the explanatory power of short 
sale at common variation of stock returns, it appears that before repeal of uptick rule 
short sale is just replaces size factor. However, after repeal of uptick rule it becomes 
an additional explanatory factor in asset pricing models which are essential for the 
fund managers using models for portfolio selection strategies and investors who 
evaluate the performance of the portfolios composed of different stocks. 
On the other hand, the results should be interpreted carefully by taking the 
particular characteristics of study period into consideration. After repeal of uptick 
rule, street demonstrations against Taksim Gezi Park started in June 2013 and 
meanwhile the index of Borsa Istanbul started to drop, and interest rates went up. 
Likewise, corruption investigations in December 2013 caused decrease and 
volatility in index. In addition, the further studies can be strengthened by employing 
a four factor model including momentum factor for short sale portfolios before and 
after repeal of uptick rule.   
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